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Abstract
Using a pure-exchange overlapping generatior^ model in which money -is valued
because of a legal restriction, we show the following: a) a benevolent government may
make some use of the inflation t^ in conjunction with a lump-sum income tax on the
young, b) the inflation tax will not be used dong with- a lump-sum income tax on the
old, and c) the welfare-maximizing monetary policy may-deviate from the Friedman
rule (contract the money supply so as to equate the real return on money and other
competing stores of value) depending on how fiscal policy is implemented.
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1 Introduction
Consider money growth rates over fairly long horizons, say, for example, a decade. At this
frequency, it is remarkable that the money growth rate is positive in almost every coimtry,
i.e., most countries are raising some revenue from the inflation tax.^ It is also true that most
countries impose legal restrictions on money holdings. In this paper, we ask whether it is
possible that these very legal restrictions make it desirable to inflate the money stock. More
precisely, if an inflation tax base has been created via a given reserve requirement, will a
benevolent government use the inflation tax as a (partial) source of revenue? Even when a
non-distortionary revenue source is available?
There is a large literature on inflationary finance and issues of optimal taxation to which
this question is related.^ In a setting with infinitely livedagents, the Friedman rule, for exam
ple, stipulates that a Pareto eflicient allocation of resources in an economy can be supported
by a policy that sets the money growth rate equal to the subjective time rate of preference
of its agents. In the presence of discounting, the PViedman rule thus requires that the
money supply should contract. Wallace (1980) studies a similar question in an overlapping-
generations economy. With money as the only store of value, Wallace demonstrates that the
Pareto efficient allocation can be supported by mgdntaining a constant money stock. With
linear storage as the competing store of value, Wallace shows that the Pareto efficient allo
cation can be supported by shrinking the money stock so as to equate the returns to storage
and money. The Friedman and the Wallace results hold for economies in which either the
goverimient does not need to finance any spending or if it does, nondistortioneiry taxes and
transfers are available for that purpose. One thing is clear, then. If nondistortionary taxes
were avEiilable and governments followedPareto efficient monetary policies, we should expect
to see nonpositive money growth rates. Which still leaves our question open: why do we
observe positive money growth rates?
The literature has provided at least two answers to our question. First, starting with
Phelps (1973), researchers have abandoned the assumption of unavailability of nondistor
tionary taxes. Both Phelps, and later Helpman and Sadka (1979), derive conditions under
which seigniorage is part of an optimalpolicy package with other distortionary taxes. '^"^ The
second way is enunciated by Freeman (1987) who studied an overlapping generations model
^See Click (1998) for evidence on money growth rates across countries.
^See Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Correia £ind Teles
(1999) for an up-to-date treatment of the issues.
^Helpman and Sadka (1979) use an overlapping generations framework. They present two versions of
their model, one in which money is the only store of value and is held because there is no second period
income, and one in which money co-exists with bonds and is held because it enters the preferences of agents
in the tradition of Sidrauski (1967). If lump-sum taxes were available in their world, then it is apparent
that in both the versions (especially the latter), the use of seigniorage would not be desirable. The reason
we can demonstrate desirability of seigniorage is that we have a fixed unremovable distortion in the form
of a binding legal restriction which forces agents to hold some units of a return-dominated asset. In other
words, how the rate of return dominance problem of money is solved by Helpman and Sadka, namely putting
money in the utility function, matters crucially. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing the Helpman
and Sadka paper to our attention, and for suggesting the above line of thinking.
''In recent years, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996) and Correia and Teles (1999) have challenged
the Phelps intuition, and succeeded in resurrecting the optimality of the Friedman rule in the presence of
distortionary taxes.
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with return-dominated money in which a legal restriction forces-people to hold money, and
seigniorage is the only revenue source for the government. Freeman shows that the station
ary utility-maximizing monetary pohcy is to set the reserve requirement at the minimum
feasible level, and inflate the money stock away at an infinite rate. In essence, F^reeman's
pohcy mimics a nondistortionary tax since, it entirely, confiscates the agent's forced holding
of real money balances. Freem^'s analysis, however, cannot account for why we observe
positive yet finite money growth rates around the world.
In this paper, we fill a niche between .the Helpman-Sadka analysis and Freeman's work
in that we try to justify the place of seigniorage in a welfare-maximizing fiscal tool kit
that include nondistortionary instruments. We extend the Freeman setup by allowing the.
government access to lump-sum taxation alongside seigniorage. .. Like Freeman, money is
valued because it satisfies a legal restriction; unlike Freeman, the legal restriction is not a
choice variable for the government. We extend the Helpman and Sadka setup by making
nondistorting taxes available. Unlike them, we solve the return-dominance problem by fixing
a reserve requirement. Young agents.receive a fixed endo\^TOent of the consumption good,
the old receive nothing. There are two primary assets, storage and money. The latter is
rate of return dominated by the former. Agents hold money solely to satisfy an unremovable
legal restriction (reserve requirement).^ There is a government that has to finance a fixed
level of useless purchases every period. To that end, it reuses the-revenue from either a
nondistortionary income tax on the young or sei^iorage, or some combination of the two.
The government's budget.is balanced period by period. Private agents take the policies
of the government as given, and compute their own decision rules regarding how much to
consume in each period. The government, in turn, takes these "policy reaction functions"
as given, and chooses the mix of the inflation tax ^d the non-distortionary tax, so as to
maximize the welfare ofcurrent and future generations in a stationary setting. We ask, will
such a government ever choose the inflation tax as a revenue-raising tool?
Ourmain result is easily summarized. -A benevolent government may,wish to raise some
positive fraction of its revenue from the inflation tax even when a nondistortionary tax is
available. The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose the government increases the
portion ofits spending financed by nondistortionary taxes, effectively decreasing the fraction
of spending flnanced by seigniorage. On the "good" side of the seigniorage Laffer- curve,
money growth rates can now be lowered. Withslower money growth, the real return to saving
increases. Even when saving is .totally unresp)onsive to its return, ceteris paribus, the income •
effect of an increase in the interest rate raises second period consumption. On the other
hand, the increase in tax payments when young results in less first-period disposable income,
thereby reducing the quantity ofsaving, and hence possibly, second period coi^umption. On
balance, lifetime utility ofcurrent and future generations may increase or.decrease in response
^We rely on some outside (unmodelled) factor to motivate the existence of the reserve requirement.
For instance, during the Great Depression, the Congressional Record indicates that deposit insurance was
foremost in policymakers minds' as they debated the application of this tool. Throughout this paper, we
treat the reserve requirement as exogenously given and focus exclusively on the public finance considerations
that arise-when reserve requirements are present.
®We are searching among policies that maximize stationary lifetime utility. In asecond-best world, Pareto
efficient policies'may ormay not maximize welfare. We will also be ignoring the welfare ofthe initial old in ,
our welfare assessments.
to an increase in nondistortionary taxes. We derive conditions in which lifetime welfare is
greater with some use of the inflation tax.
Notice that monetary policy can be used to undo the distortion to saving caused by the
legal restriction. The Friedman rule accordingly advises the central bank to contract the
money stock so that money and the linear storage technology ofier the same return. We
show that this advice is dominated in a stationary welfare sense by a poHcy that combines
a lump-sum tax on' the young and some seigniorage. Why? If the government followed the
Friedman rule, taxes on the young would have to finance the government spending in addition
to making up for lost seigniorage. This "overtaxing" of the young may be detrimental to
welfare. Our exercise is therefore a classic application of the theorem of the second best.
Indeed, as Woodford (1990) states, "...in the presence of additional distortions, no available
policy may achieve a 'first-best' allocation, and among the allocations that are attainable,
the best one need not be any of the ones that happen to reduce the nominal interest rate to
zero. This idea is familiar from the 'theory of the second best' in public finance" (p.1086).
There is a caveat though. Thus far, we have compared the inflation tax with an ex-
ogenously specified alternative revenue source, a lump-sum tax on the young. If instead,
we compare the inflation tax against a lump-sum tax on the old, we find that the welfare-
maximizing monetary policy is to hold the money stock fixed. Moreover, we show that
implementing the Friedman rule (shrinking the money stock) via a lump-sum tax on the old,
.may produce higher welfare than using the combination of lump-sum taxes on the young
and seigniorage. We go onto show that implementing the Friedman rule via a lump-sum tax
on the old may produce higher welfare than if the same were implemented via a lump-sum
tax on the young.
In sum, one of the things we have shown is that in an overlapping-generations model
with reserve requirements, welfare-maximizing monetary policy may deviate significantly
from the Friedman (equal-real-return) rule, depending on how fiscal policy is implemented.
The novelty of this result lies partly in the fact that such a result could not be obteiined in a
model with infinitely-lived representative agents. In those models, the Friedman rule can be
implemented in only one way; by changing the transfers to the agents at each date. There
the entire issue is whether the variations in money growth required by the Friedman rule
are brought about via lump-sum transfers or not. The question of timing of these transfers
is moot. In contrast, in an overlapping generations model, as is well-known from Wallace
(1980) and Sargent (1987), there are many competing ways of implementing the Friedman
rule. Additionally, the timing of policy typically matters. One of our contributions then is
to show that how the Friedman rule is implemented matters in determining whether welfare-
maximizing monetary policy deviates from it or not, an insight that cannot be generated
using monetary models with infinitely lived agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environ
ment for the case where the inflation tax is compared to an alternative revenue source: a
nondistortionary income tax on the young. It contains a statement (and detailed discussion)
of our main result: a benevolent government would raise some positive fraction of its revenue
from the inflation tax even when a nondistortionary tax is available. Section 3 considers the
model in which the inflation tax is compared to a nondistortionary income tax on the old.
Here we show that the taxing the old is preferred by current and future generations to raising
seigniorage. We conclude in Section 4.
2 The model with a lumpHSum tax on the young
We consider an economy consisting of an.infinite sequence of two-period lived overlapping
generations, an initial old generation, and an infinitely-lived government. Let t be the time
index, with t = 0,1,2, ...At each date < > 1, a new generation comprised of N identical
agents appears. Each such agent is endowed with y units of a perishable consumption good
only when young. They all have identical preferences over their young-age and old-age
consumption summarized by a time-separable utility function,
U{ci,c2) =ii(ci) + i;(c2), (1)
where c\ (02) denotes the consumption when young (old). We assume that u and v are twice
continuously differentiable, and strictly concave;'formally, u'^v' > 0, u",v" < 0.
There are two primary assets in this economy: storage and money. Each unit of the
consumption good placed into storage at date t yields x > 1 units of the consumption good
at date <-(-1. Let pt denote the time t price level. Because fiat money does not pay any
explicit interest, its gross real return between t andi -1-1 is
Pt+i
Following Freeman(1987) and others, we assume that all storageactivity is intermediated.
Specifically, there is a composite asset, called "deposits", that are sold by banks. Banks
operate in a perfectly competitive environment, taking the price of deposits and the gross
real return on storage goods as giyen. There is no cost to creating these deposits. Let the
gross real return on deposits between t and t + 1 be represented by n.
Banks are subject to a standard currency reserve requirement in that they are required
to hold money balances worth at least 7 goods for each unit deposited with them.^ With
^ ^ reserve requirement will bind in equilibrium. Let m denote nominal money
balances per young person. Then, mt —'yptdt holds. The gross real return to deposits is a
weighted average of the returns to storage and money, the weights being pinned dpw by
the reserve requirement. Formally,
n = (1 - '7) X+7-^'. (2)
Pt+i
The government has a fixed "purposeless" spending ofg units (per young person) each
period. The revenue needed to fund this expenditure comes from the revenues raised by
the two wings of the government, the treasury and the central bank. The former collects
lump-sum taxes from the young. The latter controls the (aggregate) nominal money stock,
iW, contributing to the government's revenue needs by creating money. Let (p denote the
fraction of the government's spending that lump-sum taxes will cover (henceforth,- referred
to as the tax-responsibility parameter).
Let r be the quantity ofgoods that each young person pays in the form ofa lump-sum
tax. The representative agent born at date t >•! chooses non-negative combinations of ci
and C2 such that (1) is maximized subject to the following per-period budget constraints:
• y-T = ci-\-dt,
^Our formulation of the reserve requirement is standard and follows FVeeman (1987) and Woodford (1990;
appendix A.4). The government faces afixed, time-irg'ariant 7.
, >
and
ndt =C2.
The first order conditions for an interior optimum ^e given by
c^ = ftcl. (3)
The optimal quantity of deposits, d*, is defined as
d* = d(rt, y) = argmax [u{y - r - dj) + v{rtdt)]. (4)
dt
The government budget constraint is represented (in per-young person terms) as
rrit — rrit-i . .S=r+^ . (5)
Let T= 3^d j = (1 ~0)5* We do not restrict the value of <p to the [0,1
intervEil. ^ > 1 is equivalent to a case in which the .money stock shrinks; then, lump-sum
taxes would have to cover both the spending and the loss in seigniorage revenue. The special
case, (?!> = 1, is one in which taxes fully back the level of government spending. In contrast,
when 0 = 0, the government's spending is funded entirely through money creation. The
government chooses (p to maximize a representative agent's lifetime welfare in a stationary
setting.
Throughout the analysis, we assume that nominal money growth is dictated by the
rule, Mt = 9Mt-i, where 9 is the gross rate of money growth. It is then apparent that
money growth plays a role in government financing whenever <^ < 1.® In equilibrium, the
government budget constraint (5) may be rewritten as:
5 = n + (6)
Pt \ 9J
Herej 9 is endogenous in the sense that changes in (p will prompt the central bank to adjust
9 in order to satisfy (6) for all t > 1.
In steady states, the money market clearing condition implies that Thus, using,
(2), it follows that r = (1 —7)x+ ^. In addition, the central bank's steady state seigniorage
revenue responsibility is defined by = jd* (l —~) = {1 —(p) g from where we can
compute the money growth rate as
i = 1_
9 'yd*
and the return to deposits as,
®The Einalysis below is conducted with (f) as the variable of interest. Equivalently, one could choose 0,
taking r as the residual that ensures the government budget constraint is satisfied. Our task ahead is to
show that a benevolent government would choose a 0 e (0,1) or equivalently, a. 6 > 1.
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r = (1—7)a; + 7 1-
(i-0)g'
7d*
(7)
The steady state level of welfare for all future generations is obtained by substituting the
equilibrium decision rules into the agent's utility function. Formally,
W{(l})=u[y- d*{T, y) - ^g]} +[r •d*{r, y) (8)
From (8), the reader can see the different channels through which changes in the tax re
sponsibility parameter affect lifetime welfare. In addition to the direct impact, there axe two
channels reflecting the additional effects that changes in (j> have on welfare.
The direct effect is captured by the last term inside w(.)- Here, an increase in the
tax-responsibility parameter, for example, results in a decline in the agent's first-period
disposable income. If things stopped here, welfare would be decreasing in the tax respon
sibility parameter. However, the welfare analysis is complicated by the fact that both the
equilibrium level of deposits and the equilibrium gross real return to deposits are affected
by changes in the tax-responsibility parameter.
To illustrate the real-return effect, suppose, for now, that deposits are invariant to changes
in <f). Equation (7) indicates that an increase in tax-finance responsibility results in a higher
gross real return to deposits, holding the level of deposits constant. With non-distortionary
taxes bearing a larger share of the^financing, money creation supports a smaller portion.
With constant deposits, the economy is on the "good" side of the seigniorage Laffer curve;
hence, the government budget constraint is satisfied at a lower money growth rate. With
a decline in the money growth rate, the gross real return to deposits increases. It follows
then second-period consumption (or equivalently, old-age utility) would increase.
Of course, the equilibrium levelof deposits will vary with (j) and this effect further muddles
our efforts to assign a direction of change to lifetime welfare. Formally, the total derivative
of lifetime utility with respect to the tax-responsibility parameter is®
W'{<l>) = -u'{cl)[dl " ff] + v'{c2)[r^d* -f- rd*r^ + rd*^
Using (3), we can further reduce this expression to
W'{(l>) = v'{4W'r^-g (9)
Define as a solution to W'{(j>*) = 0. Our central question may then be posed as: is
<p* € (Oj 1)? Can it be that a benevolent government would choose to use some seigniorage
evenwhen a non-distortionary revenue source is available? Among other things, the answer
will depend on the size of g. Moreover, since higher lump-sum taxes imply less reliance on
seigniorage, the money growth rate should fall with an increase in the tax-responsibility
parameter; as such, the return to deposits should go up (i.e., it seems likely that > 0
holds). One approach that will yield more definitive answers would be to adopt specific
functional forms.
^In what follows, we introduce the notation Xy = —
dy '
2.1 An example with logarithmic utility
. Let preferences be represented by
U{ci,c2) =ln(ci) +ln(c2).
For this specification, the decision rule for deposits is
y-T
With T = <j)g, this reduces to
d' =
2 •
y-<l>9
(10)
(11)
For an interior solution for deposits, feasibility requires y > g. Throughout our analysis, we
will assume the feasibility condition is satisfied.
Also,
r = (1 —7)x + 7 1- (1 - <l>)9
'yd*
= (1 - 7)x + 7 (1 - (j>)g7(^)
Substitute (11) into the agent's budget constraints when young, yielding
To derive the equilibrium decision rule for old-age consumption, first substitute for r to
obtain
cj =rd* =|(1 -7)a; +71- | =^(1 -'y)xd' +id' - (1 - ^)g
then substitute for d*, yielding
c; = (1 - 7)a:
W{(j>) = hi + ln
^y-<t>g\ . fy-<l>g\
\ 2
Thus, steady state welfare is given by
'y-(l>g (1 - f)x
+ 7 \ 2 y
- (1 - (i>)g.
^y-<l>g ''y-^9
+ 7 - (1 - <p)g (12)
The following proposition computes the exact expression for the welfare-maximizing 0.
Proposition 1 Suppose
Then, a)
and b)
97 > 7 = 1 +
y(l-x)'
p-y[x + 7(l -x) - 1
0* = g[2—x-\- 7(a;—1)
0'G(O,1).
(13)
Note that 7 can be negative in which case the condition 7 > 7 would have no bite. If
7 > 7 holds (i.e., there is a minimum size reserve requirement in place^®), then Proposition 1
states that a benevolent government would always choose to make some use of the inflation
tax even when non-distortionary taxes on the young were available.
2.1.1 Remarks
Recall that the government choosy ^ so as to maximize W{(f)). The first order conditions
for an mienor solution (cJjCg) set
cj
— = 2-7-(1-7)x.
FVom (3), it follows then that
r = 2 —7 —(1- 7)0;.
Notice that, as long as 7 G (0,1) holds, r < 1 < x holds at an optimimi. Thus, for cases
depicted in Proposition 1, cj > cj holds. In contrast,,with 7 = 0,' cj = xc\ (a: > 1) would
hold, or that c\ < cj would obtain. Not surprisingly, the reserve requirement distorts the
agent's pattern of lifetime consumption. Each unit of the good deposited with the bank
earns only r units. Had it not been for the reserve requirement, each unit invested would
have earned x. Therefore, ceteris paribus, for every unit saved when young, the agent is
losing [x —r) units of income when old because of the binding reserve requirement. It is
in this sense then that the bid agents are effectively getting taxed, if the inflation tax gets
used. Why might this be a move in the "right" direction?
It may be helpful to see why seigniorage is a move in the welfare-maxirmzing direction by
considering a non-monetary economy. Suppose a benevolent government wants to raise g by
either taxing the old or the young or both in some combination. Here, the agent's problem
would be
maxlnci-}-lnc2
s.t
ci = y - Ti - s
C2 = Rs ~ T2
where ri and T2 are lump-sum taxes, 5. is savings, and R is the gross real return to savings.
SupposeTi = (pg and T2 = (1— i.e.-, the government is financing p-by a combinationof
lump-sum taxes on the young and the old. First-order conditions reveal
c;
get a sense of what this minimumhas to be, consider some plausiblevalues of g, y, and x taken from
long-run averaged US data. If we set g/y = 0.2 (the postwar average) and x = 1.02, then 7 < 0. Clearly
as X rises, 7 increases. So one's interpretation of the real return in this model will have a lot to do with
whether the condition will be satisfied in real-world economies. For the parameters listed above, suppose in
addition that 7 = 0.1. Then, for these values ofthe parameters, it may be checked that (/>' = 0.93 implying
that about 7% ofgovernment spending would be raised viaseigniorage in thismodel economy.
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from where it follows that
W{<l>} = hi
V 2 2R
\ •
+ In
/.
2R
Then, steady state welfare is given by
/y-,pg (i~tp)g\'
2R /
'P)9
It is easy to check that welfare is maximized at v? = 0 when R> I. With i? > 1, the young
can store one unit of the good and receive R goods in old age thereby more than offsetting
the tax when old. Hence, taxing only the old is most preferred.
There is an analogy in our monetary economy. First note that if the money stock is
constant, the return to deposits — r = {1 - 7) a: + 7 — (analogous to R above) is greater
than one. If lump-sum taxes on the old were possible, then using them would be best,
as we have just seen. In their absence, however, the next best thing would be to try and
mimic a tax on the old. Seigniorage does that. For every unit saved when young under
the seigniorage-use case, the agent loses (x - r) units of income when old because of the
binding reserve requirement.^^ It is in this sense that it is ultimately the old agents who are
effectively getting taxed, if the inflation tax is employed. This makes use of seigniorage a
move in the "right" direction. Our results indicate that the mere fact that use of seigniorage
indirectly taxes the old is not sufficient justification for its utilization. Indeed, as we have
shown in Proposition 1, the reserve requirement has to be large enough to merit the use of
seigniorage. If the reserve requirement is too small, the gap between returns to storage and
returns to deposits, (x —r), is too small, implying that the old cannot be "taxed" enough,
and definitely not enough to satisfy the government's financing needs. In other words, the
seigniorage tax base must be large enough for it to be desirable for the government to use
the inflation tax.
2.2 Connection with the Friedman rule
Howdoes our result match up with those obtained in the optimal inflation tax (i.e., Friedman
rule) literature? Would a government ensure a higher stationary utility for its citizens if it
simply implemented the Friedman rule? Below, we show that the answeris not an unqualified
yes.
Thus far, we have focussed on a case in which money is dominated in rate of return and
is held solely to satisfy a legal restriction. The legal restriction creates a wedge between
the return to storage and the return to saving. This distorts the incentives of agents to
save. Agents would like to get the high return from storage but cannot on their own unless
their portfolios also include money balances. The efficient allocation of resources from the
point of view of the agents thus clearly requires that the returns to storage and money be
equalized.This is achieved if ^ = a: > 1; that is, the Friedman rule. Therefore, the money
supply must contract at a rate equal to the inverse of the real return to storage. This is the
Pareto efficient monetary policy.
'^ Seigniorage therefore acts aa a proportion's' tax 011 the incomes of the old agents. In this case then, a
move to a proportional (hence, distortionary) taxon theold dominates a non-distortioriary tax on the young,
^^See Woodford (1990; appendix A.4) for anice dijj^ussion.
Consider a case in which the government has to finance a positive spending. Suppose
it follows the Friedman rule and raises all its revenue from lump-sum taxes. Would such
a pohcy necessarily maximize stationary utility? Intuitively, it is clear that following the
Friedman rule would undo the distortion to saving caused by the legal restriction (though
not remove the restriction itself) and reinstate the right incentives to save. In this case,
however, the government's financing needs would necessitate that lump-sum taxes on the
young pay for the entire government spending and the lost seigniorage. In other words, the
young would face a tax higher than what the government would have chosen for them if it
made some use of seigniorage. As such, it is quite possible that following the Friedman rule
may not produce the maximum welfare.
To formally explore this, considera casewhere the government follows the Friedman rule
and sets 9 = In this case, the reserve requirement' is there but does not bind any longer
since money earns the same as storage. Government budget balance requires
r =5+m(l-i).
If money demand is positive, then a contracting money supply [9 < 1) implies r > g : the
government loses seigniorage and so, taxes on the young back spending as well as help retire
money.
It is easy to check that deposits under the Priedman rule policy (implemented via a lump-
sum tax on the yoimg), denoted is given by • Since m = by virtue of
the reserve requirement, it follows that r = g — (1—a;) using which yields
y-9
2-7(1-x)^*
Thus, under the Friedman-rule policy, stationary welfare is given by
= ]ii{y~T-d^,y) -\-hi{x-d^y)
which when simplified yields
y-9\ 7(l-a:)
2 —7 (1—x)
+ ln
^ iu - 9)
2-7(1-x),
Can Wijj)') with <p* e (0,1), as defined in (??.), be greater than Below, we illustrate
with an example that the answer can be yes.
Example 1 Let the parameters of the economy be as follows: y = I, 9 = 0.08; 7 = 0.173,
and X = 1.07. Then, <p' = 0.29 and W(4>*) = -1.4935, while = -1.4974. That
is, stationary welfare is higher with partial use of seigniorage and lump-sum taxes on the
young than under the Priedman rule implemented via a lump-sum tax on the young. Similar
examples are easy to generxde.
^^There ismore than one way to implement the Fciedman rule to get a Pareto optimal equilibrium. For
example, one could impose a lump-sum tax on the old. to retire the currency, and still tax the young to
finance g. There is aunique Pareto optimum here onlj because we have ruled out taxes on the old.
In the presence of distortions, following the Friedman rule may achieve a 'first-best'
allocation, but among the allocations that are attainable, the best one need not be the
one attained via the Friedman rule. Another way to restate this insight would be: welfare-
maximizing monetary policy may deviate significantly from the Friedman rule in the presence
of unremovable legal restrictions. The next section deals with a caveat to this result.
3 The model with a lump-sum tax on the old
To recap, our results thus far indicate that it may be welfare-maximizing to use seigniorage
if the alternative revenue source is a lump-sum tax on the young. This in itself is novel
in that it challenges the textbook Friedman rule wisdom that usage of the inflation tax is
"suboptimal" when non-distortionary taxes are available. However, if we are to place our
result somewhere amidst the larger issue of optimality of seigniorage, we would, at the very
least, have to address the question of exogeneity of the alternative form of taxation, and its
impact on our result. Is our result immune to the timing of the alternative tax or is it that
the demographic structure of the overlapping generations model imposes strictures on the
set of alternative tax sources that would leave our result unaffected? The latter is a very
general question largely outside the scope of the current paper.
In this section we attempt a limited and more modest answer to this last question. To
that end, we study the welfare impacts of the inflation tax alongside a lump-sum tax on
the old. To foreshadow, we show the following: it is never welfare-maximizing to use the
inflation tax if the alternative revenue source is a lump-sum tax on the old. We use a model
identical in all aspects, except one, to the model economy we studied above; the exception
is that the treasury can impose a lump-sum tax on the old instead of the young. To save on
space, we use the same notation as above, and only sketch some of the details below.
We assume that the agent maximizes a program with additively-separable logarithmic
preferences, facing a lump-sum tax of r when old. Hence, max In ci + In s.t Ci =y—rf,and
C2 = rd —r. In equilibrium, deposits are given by d* = ^ The returns to deposits
are r = (1—7)x -1- 7
b)
1 _
7d"
The next lemma computes the exact expression for r and
studies its comparative static properties.
Lemma 2 Define g= [(1 - j)x -H 7] and X = {yq -I- 2p (| —l)}. Then,
a)
r =
> 0
As before, the government chooses (j) by maximizing stationary welfare. Recall that in
equilibrium, cj = y—d*, and cj = rd*—4>g. Then, steady state welfare is given by Incj -l-lncj
which after simplification yields.
W{(f>) = In
^2
+ ln
ry 4>9
Then, straightforward differentiation reveals .
=7'{^Ci \ Z
Using (3), it is easy to check that (14) reduces to
'4>9
2clW'[<l>) = + y - 2g.
9
2J
(14)
Proposition 3 W'{4>) > 0 holds. In otherwords, if lump-sum taxes on the oldare available,
then the welfare-maximizing monetary policy is to hold the money stock constant.
The intuition behind 3 is straightforward. Ima;gine that the government needs to obtain
one unit of the good to balance its budget. It can raise the revenue from seigniorage or
from lump-sum taxes on the old or some combination. In either case, as we have discussed
before, it is the old that pay the tax. There is no difference in the wealth effect of the two
policies. However, seigniorage carries with it an additional distortionary effect. Accordingly,
a benevolent government prefers to use the lump-sum tax. As we have discussed in Section
2.1.1, shifting the taxes to the old instead of the young is welfeire improving if the gross
return to savings exceeds unity (which it does here when the money stock is held fixed).
3.1 Connection with the Friedman rule
Suppose the government implements the FViedman rule (shrinks the money stock so as to
equalize the returns on money and storage) via a lump-sum tax on the old. Will such a
policy produce higher stationary welfare than the combination policy of using lump-sum
taxes on the young and seigniorage? In this case, it is easy to verify that deposits under this
Friedman rule implementation, denoted d^° , is given by
2 2x
and hence, stationary welfare is given-by
= In [y - d '^^ l + In [a;. d""" - r
where r = g—^d^" (1 —x). The following example shows that stationarywelfare canbe lower
with partial use of seigniorage and lump-sum taxes on the young than under the Friedman
rule implemented via lump-sum taxes on the old.
Example 2 Let the parameters of the economy be as follows: y = I, g = 0.08, 7 = 0.173,
andx = 1.07. Then, <p* = 0.29 and W(<j)* = 0.29) = -1.49342, while = -1.48604.
That is, stationary welfare is lower with partial use of seigniorage and lump-sum taxes on
the young than under the Friedman rule implemented via lump-sum taxes on the old. Also
notice that implying that implementing the Friedman rule by a lump-sum tax
on the old produces higher welfare implementing the same via a lump-sum tax on the young.
Similar examples are easy to generate.
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Intuitively, it is clear that following the Friedman rule removes the distortion to saving.
Also, a lump-sum tax on the old increases saving. Suppose the government has to raise one
unit of the good as revenue. Since the return on saving (re) is greater than one, agents are
better off if they are taxed one unit of the good while old and are allowed to get x > 1 in
return. As we have seen before, the same would not be true if the tax was on the young.
To summarize, our results indicate that the question of whether the Friedman rule coincides
with the welfare-maximizing monetary policy or not can only be answered once it is known
how the Friedman rule is implemented.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we examine welfare-maximizing monetary policy in a second-best world with
reserve requirements. We derive our results in a simple general equilibrium model with
finitely lived agents. In the model, there is a benevolent government that must finance a
fixed level of spending through a package of lump-sum taxes and seigniorage. Interestingly,
the inflation tax may be part of a welfare-maximizing policy package if the only alternative
is taxing young agents. A tax on the young means less disposable income when young,
which could potentially lower lifetime utility more than what an agent would obtain from a
higher return when old. We also demonstrate that the inflation tax will not be used if the
government has access to lump-sum taxes for the old. We go on to show that the welfare-
maximizing monetary poHcy may deviate significantly from the Friedman rule (equalizing
real returns), depending on the nature of the fiscal policy.
There are two features of this model economy that are crucial to obtaining our result
about the inflation tax being part of a welfare-maximizing tool kit. First, in the economy,
there is an unremovable reserve requirement which the government takes as given. If the gov
ernment were instead given the option to choose the utility-maximizing reserve requirement
in the presence of lump-sum taxes, then it seems clear that the optimal reserve requirement
would be zero; the government would not use the inflation tax at all. For our purposes, it is
essential that there is some reason - other than public finance - why the reserve requirement
is present. Governments, for instance, routinely legislate reserve requirements to impose
discipline on financial institutions. Second, our result is also predicated on the requirement
that the government not have access to taxes on the old. We think that taxes only on the
young are not so far fetched either, especially in light of the prevalence of old-age pensions
around the world.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
We differentiate (12) with respect to <j),set the resulting expression to zero and obtain,
C2— = 2 - 7 - (1 - 7)a;
Using (3), we can get,
r = (1 —'y)x + 7
which after simplification yields
1-
(1 - 'l>)9
7(=^)
= 2 - 7 - (1 - 7)x
2 —7 —(1—7)2 = (1 - 7)2: + 7 - 2(1 - 0)g
y-<l>9
From here, one can solve for the optimal value, <p* :
p[2 —X+ 7(x —1)
For a strictly positive solution, we need that
g>y[x-\- 7(1 - x) - 1
which is true when 7 > 7. To see if 0* < 1, suppose instead that (p* > I. Then, (A.l) impHes
that
g —y[x + 7(1 —x) —1] > g[2—X+ j(x —1)
which upon simplification implies x < 1 which is a contradiction.
B Proof of Lemma 2
a) Use the expression for optimal deposits to get
r=(1 - 7)2: +7- ^
which after substantial simpUfication yields
2 2r If ^ 'i 2
Straightforward rearrangement yields
2 + 2r
f 4> \
(l-7)x + 7]+5 --1
/
yr - = X
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or, the quadratic,
The result follows,
b) (B.l) implies
—
\y J y
yr^ -r[yq + g(j)- 2g\ -(j>gq = ^
Then, straightforward differentiation yields
^ ^ g + g) ^ ff (y + g)
dcj) 2yr -yq-g<p-\-2g 2yr - X
Also (B.l) implies that yr —^ = X, and so we have
dr g{r + q) g{r-\-q)
d(j> 2y'i— 2/r +
r
C Proof of Proposition 3
We have to show that
To see this, note that
'<l>9
2clW'{<P) = <f>9 + 2/
yr+ ^
> 0.
dr
d(p
-2g>0
+ y
dr _ f g{r-\-q) _g{r + q) (<^5 + ^y)
d(j)
Then,
2c^W'W =
which simplfies to
(l>9
+ y
dr
d(p
yr2 + (j)gq
yr + ^
-^^9 = 9
yr^ + (l)gq
(r + q) {4>g + ry)
yr"^ + (j)gq
{q - r) {ry - (pg)
-2
Recall cj = ^ {ry—(pg) > 0. Also, q > r always holds. Then, the proof is done.
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Figure 1: Dependence of welfare on the money growth rate, 6, when only lump-sum taxes on the
young are allowed
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Figure 2: Dependence of welfare on the money growth rate, 6, when only lump-sum taxes on the
old are allowed
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